capgo.app vulnerability

What happened

Capgo (capgo.app backend, versions ≤ 12.261.0) improperly restricts which roles the apikey_manager organization role may bind to newly created API keys. When an authenticated user holding only apikey_manager (permissions org.manage_apikeys and org.read) calls POST /apikey with a JWT session, the only checks applied are the org.manage_apikeys permission, a fixed deny-list of assignable role names (APIKEY_MANAGER_DENIED_ASSIGNABLE_ROLES in public/apikey/scope.ts), and a priority-rank comparison in createRoleBindingForPrincipal (private/role_bindings.ts). No check verifies that the caller actually holds the permissions conferred by the role being assigned. Because the deny-list omits the deploy roles app_developer, app_uploader, channel_developer and channel_uploader, and apikey_manager is seeded with priority_rank 78 — higher than those roles' ranks (68, 66, 58, 57) — the rank check also passes. As a result, an apikey_manager who cannot upload bundles or promote channels can mint an API key bound to a deploy role and use it to push arbitrary OTA JavaScript updates to all end users of the organization's apps. As of the advisory publication no patched version was available.

Affected versions

capgo.app: See vendor advisory Fixed: See vendor advisory.

Why it matters

Review the vendor advisory and exposure of the affected product to determine operational impact.

Detection & mitigation

• Apply vendor-provided updates or mitigations.
• Review affected product exposure and access logs.