What happened
Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is 'r2-direct', which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication.
Affected versions
capgo.app: See vendor advisory Fixed: See vendor advisory.
Why it matters
Review the vendor advisory and exposure of the affected product to determine operational impact.
Detection & mitigation
- Apply vendor-provided updates or mitigations.
- Review affected product exposure and access logs.
Public PoC references
No public PoC reference has passed the current publication threshold.