What happened
heym, a workflow automation platform, stores and returns multiple capability secrets in plaintext in versions prior to 0.0.91. Affected secrets include webhook header-auth values (returned in cleartext by GET /api/workflows/{id} and persisted unsanitized into execution history), MCP API keys (stored as a plaintext column, returned in config/list responses, and accepted via the ?key= query string so they leak into logs, proxies and Referer headers), portal session tokens (stored and validated by plaintext equality with a 168-hour TTL), workflow execution JWTs (stored in full and re-listed by GET .../execution-tokens), Discord interaction tokens (the full interaction body is stored in execution history), and global variables. A user with read access to a workflow, share/team membership, or anyone able to read the database, a backup, or logs can recover these secrets and replay them to execute workflows or act as the secret owner.
Affected versions
heym: before 0.0.91 (semver) Fixed: See vendor advisory.
Why it matters
Review the vendor advisory and exposure of the affected product to determine operational impact.
Detection & mitigation
- Apply vendor-provided updates or mitigations.
- Review affected product exposure and access logs.
Public PoC references
No public PoC reference has passed the current publication threshold.