OTP vulnerability

What happened

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits. uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.

Affected versions

OTP: 21.0 through before 27.3.4.17 (otp); 28.0 through before 28.5.0.6 (otp); 29.0 through before 29.0.6 (otp); 3.5 through before 6.2.2.5 (otp); 7.0 through before 7.3.0.2 (otp); 8.0 through before 8.0.4 (otp); 29a9dd0e17a97a3e6e46f0d08c6ba8f31db33f5e through before * (git) Fixed: See vendor advisory.

Why it matters

Review the vendor advisory and exposure of the affected product to determine operational impact.

Detection & mitigation

• Apply vendor-provided updates or mitigations.
• Review affected product exposure and access logs.